Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'The Analysis of Mind' and 'Reference and Necessity'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6417 In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling]
6474 Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6476 We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
2792 It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
22326 Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
6475 In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
7518 If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
7520 Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
7519 Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]