10 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |