22 ideas
17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis] |
7445 | The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis] |
4988 | Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM] |
4987 | Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM] |
7443 | A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG] |
17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |
17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |