22 ideas
18781 | Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares] |
18789 | Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares] |
18790 | Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares] |
18787 | Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares] |
18793 | Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares] |
18784 | In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares] |
18786 | Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares] |
18780 | Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares] |
18782 | The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares] |
18783 | Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares] |
18792 | Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares] |
18785 | Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares] |
18788 | For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares] |
7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
18791 | In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares] |