Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'Platonistic Theories of Universals' and 'Subjective and Objective'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

12 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
8964 Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
8962 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
8961 Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
8963 Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
3296 Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
3295 Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
3293 If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3292 The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
7518 If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
7519 Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
7520 Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
3294 As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]