20 ideas
8251 | The logical space of reasons is a natural phenomenon, and it is the realm of freedom [McDowell] |
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
8128 | Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge] |
19092 | There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth] |
8253 | Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell] |
7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
8254 | Forming concepts by abstraction from the Given is private definition, which the Private Lang. Arg. attacks [McDowell] |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |