14 ideas
12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
6408 | Russell needed three extra axioms to reduce maths to logic: infinity, choice and reducibility [Grayling] |
12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
6414 | Two propositions might seem self-evident, but contradict one another [Grayling] |
7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |