Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton)'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron]
A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis]
Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]