Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'The Rationalists'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]