Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic' and 'The Nature of Mental States'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
10001 An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10007 Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
10002 '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber]
9998 What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10003 Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
10008 Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
10005 Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
10000 We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
10006 First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
10004 Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
7518 If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
7519 Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
7520 Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]