Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'How Things Might Have Been', 'Morality and Art' and 'What is Justified Belief?'

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27 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8830 A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
8832 If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8829 Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
8831 Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
22445 Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
22444 A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
22447 Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
22448 We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
22446 In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]