Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Defending the Axioms', 'Shame and Necessity' and 'Necessary Beings'

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale]
With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy]
If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale]
Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]