14 ideas
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
10594 | Henkin semantics is more plausible for plural logic than for second-order logic [Maddy] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |