30 ideas
13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
14480 | Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson] |
17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
14471 | Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson] |
17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
14493 | Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson] |
14491 | Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson] |
14489 | Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson] |
14485 | Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson] |
14487 | The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson] |
21651 | It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber] |
14467 | Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson] |
14479 | To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson] |
14486 | Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson] |
14481 | Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson] |
14482 | If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson] |
14483 | Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson] |
14476 | Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson] |
14477 | Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson] |
14478 | Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson] |
14466 | A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson] |
14475 | How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson] |
14474 | Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson] |
14488 | Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson] |