Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Second Philosophy', 'The Nature of Mental States' and 'Are Persons Bodies?'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10594 Henkin semantics is more plausible for plural logic than for second-order logic [Maddy]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
3238 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
3239 You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]