17 ideas
| 8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
| 8755 | Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro] |
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| 10718 | A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver] |
| 8756 | Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro] |
| 17733 | We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins] |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| 8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
| 8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
| 8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
| 8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
| 8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
| 8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
| 8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
| 8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
| 8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
| 8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |