96 ideas
15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
19767 | Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau] |
15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
19757 | No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau] |
15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
19760 | General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau] |
19759 | Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau] |
19758 | Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau] |
15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
19773 | Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau] |
19769 | Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau] |
19752 | If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau] |
19768 | The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau] |
19766 | The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau] |
19756 | Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau] |
19755 | Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau] |
19762 | Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau] |
19763 | I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau] |
19765 | Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau] |
19779 | Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau] |
19771 | Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau] |
19778 | Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau] |
19751 | Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau] |
19774 | A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau] |
19772 | In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau] |
19789 | It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau] |
19787 | People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau] |
19780 | We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau] |
19747 | Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau] |
19748 | Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau] |
19749 | In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau] |
19775 | People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau] |
19784 | Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau] |
19785 | If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau] |
19746 | Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau] |
19786 | Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau] |
19788 | The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau] |
19777 | Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau] |
19782 | What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau] |
19781 | Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau] |
19754 | If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau] |
19750 | Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau] |
19770 | Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau] |
19783 | A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau] |
19753 | Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau] |
19761 | Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau] |
19776 | Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau] |