15 ideas
| 9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
| 8755 | Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro] |
| 10718 | A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver] |
| 8756 | Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro] |
| 17733 | We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins] |
| 9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
| 9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
| 9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
| 9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
| 9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
| 9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
| 2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
| 2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
| 9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |