14 ideas
| 17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
| 17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
| 12220 | Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K] |
| 12222 | Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K] |
| 17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
| 17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
| 17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
| 17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
| 17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
| 3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel] |
| 3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
| 4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
| 3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
| 4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |