Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Defending the Axioms', 'On Certainty' and 'Counting and the Natural Numbers'

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13 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy]
If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
The essence of natural numbers must reflect all the functions they perform [Sicha]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
To know how many, you need a numerical quantifier, as well as equinumerosity [Sicha]
Counting puts an initial segment of a serial ordering 1-1 with some other entities [Sicha]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein]