18 ideas
18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
19513 | A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose] |
19514 | Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose] |
19515 | We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose] |
19510 | In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose] |
19516 | Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose] |
19511 | If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose] |
19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |