Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Defending the Axioms', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'Davidson on himself'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
6855 Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
3972 Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
3969 There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
6856 Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
17610 The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
17620 Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17605 Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy]
17625 If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
17615 Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
17618 Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
17614 The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6857 An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
3960 There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3964 If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
3965 Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
3961 Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
3963 There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3966 The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
3967 Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3974 Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
3968 Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
3970 Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
3971 There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
3973 Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
3962 Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]