Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Realism in Mathematics', 'Without Immediate Justification' and 'Against the Ethicists (one book)'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
22752 Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
8755 Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10718 A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
8756 Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17733 We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8851 Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8849 Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8853 Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8855 Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8852 In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
22754 Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
22755 Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
22756 If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus]