Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Defending the Axioms', 'Laches' and 'Ways of Worldmaking'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
291 Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
17651 Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
17652 Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
17610 The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
17620 Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17605 Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy]
17625 If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
17615 Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
17618 Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
17614 The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17656 Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
17661 We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
17659 Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
17657 We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
17654 A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
17660 Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17658 Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
17650 We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
17655 Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
293 Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
17649 If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]