Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Realism in Mathematics', 'Identity and Necessity' and 'Rechnungsmethoden (dissertation)'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Quantity is inconceivable without the idea of addition [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms [Frege]
Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]