18 ideas
| 13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
| 17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
| 17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
| 17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
| 17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
| 17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
| 17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
| 17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
| 13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
| 13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
| 13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
| 18076 | Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher] |
| 22191 | Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham] |
| 22183 | Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn] |
| 6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn] |
| 22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha] |
| 7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn] |
| 13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |