65 ideas
17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
10373 | Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J] |
17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
10367 | There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J] |
20589 | Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20583 | If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20584 | Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20598 | In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20614 | People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20596 | For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20593 | The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20608 | Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20597 | If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20606 | Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20600 | Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20609 | If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20605 | Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20599 | How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20601 | Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20613 | We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20586 | Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20587 | Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20591 | If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20602 | Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20604 | Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20603 | One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20607 | Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20612 | If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20611 | If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20610 | Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20617 | How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20615 | Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20616 | During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20620 | If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20619 | Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
10359 | In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J] |
10372 | Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J] |
10374 | There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J] |
10366 | Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J] |
10377 | Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J] |
10378 | A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J] |
10382 | Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J] |
10375 | At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J] |
10389 | Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J] |
10390 | Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J] |
10380 | Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J] |
10385 | If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
10387 | The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J] |
10388 | Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J] |
10384 | If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J] |
10386 | If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J] |
10361 | Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J] |
10360 | Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J] |
10362 | One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J] |
10368 | If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J] |
10383 | The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J] |
10393 | Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J] |
10394 | Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J] |
10376 | The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J] |
10381 | All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J] |