20 ideas
22396 | We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot] |
22397 | Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot] |
17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
22402 | Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot] |
23145 | Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver] |
22401 | Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot] |
22398 | Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot] |
22403 | Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot] |
22400 | Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot] |