28 ideas
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
15959 | If the substantial form of brass implies its stability, how can it melt and remain brass? [Alexander,P] |
15956 | The peripatetics treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter, and non-material [Alexander,P] |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
15975 | Can the qualities of a body be split into two groups, where the smaller explains the larger? [Alexander,P] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
15963 | Science has been partly motivated by the belief that the universe is run by God's laws [Alexander,P] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
15951 | Alchemists tried to separate out essences, which influenced later chemistry [Alexander,P] |
15981 | Absolute space either provides locations, or exists but lacks 'marks' for locations [Alexander,P] |