Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introducing Persons', 'Nature and Meaning of Numbers' and 'The Problem of the Soul'

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49 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 9. Recursive Definition
Dedekind proved definition by recursion, and thus proved the basic laws of arithmetic [Dedekind, by Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
An infinite set maps into its own proper subset [Dedekind, by Reck/Price]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
We have the idea of self, and an idea of that idea, and so on, so infinite ideas are available [Dedekind, by Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Dedekind originally thought more in terms of mereology than of sets [Dedekind, by Potter]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are free creations of the human mind, to understand differences [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Dedekind defined the integers, rationals and reals in terms of just the natural numbers [Dedekind, by George/Velleman]
Ordinals can define cardinals, as the smallest ordinal that maps the set [Dedekind, by Heck]
Order, not quantity, is central to defining numbers [Dedekind, by Monk]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Dedekind's ordinals are just members of any progression whatever [Dedekind, by Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Dedekind's axiom that his Cut must be filled has the advantages of theft over honest toil [Dedekind, by Russell]
Dedekind says each cut matches a real; logicists say the cuts are the reals [Dedekind, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
In counting we see the human ability to relate, correspond and represent [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / b. Mark of the infinite
A system S is said to be infinite when it is similar to a proper part of itself [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Dedekind gives a base number which isn't a successor, then adds successors and induction [Dedekind, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Zero is a member, and all successors; numbers are the intersection of sets satisfying this [Dedekind, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Categoricity implies that Dedekind has characterised the numbers, because it has one domain [Rumfitt on Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Induction is proved in Dedekind, an axiom in Peano; the latter seems simpler and clearer [Dedekind, by Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Dedekind originated the structuralist conception of mathematics [Dedekind, by MacBride]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
Dedekindian abstraction talks of 'positions', where Cantorian abstraction talks of similar objects [Dedekind, by Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
A thing is completely determined by all that can be thought concerning it [Dedekind]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers]
Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan]
We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan]
Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan]
We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Dedekind said numbers were abstracted from systems of objects, leaving only their position [Dedekind, by Dummett]
We derive the natural numbers, by neglecting everything of a system except distinctness and order [Dedekind]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Dedekind has a conception of abstraction which is not psychologistic [Dedekind, by Tait]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan]