11 ideas
| 23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
| 17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
| 23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
| 14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
| 14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
| 14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
| 14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
| 14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |