Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'The Concept of Logical Consequence' and 'Philosophy of Language'

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14 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17962 The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
15163 The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
18812 Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
13344 X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
15158 Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
15157 Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15156 The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
13343 A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions [Tarski]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15162 We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
15161 There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
15152 To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
15153 Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
15154 We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
13345 Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them [Tarski]