147 ideas
12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |
5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |