9 ideas
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 2957 | Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood] |
| 3285 | We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel] |