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All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'Substance' and 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
21704 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17962 The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21705 Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
21723 The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21721 Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
21703 Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
21714 The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
21713 Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
21715 For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
12056 An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12050 Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
12052 We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins]
12055 Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins]
12059 A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins]
12063 Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins]
12051 If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins]
12053 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins]
12054 Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
12047 We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
12057 Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
12064 The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins]
12049 Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
12065 Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins]