Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'The Bacchae' and 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Our ancient beliefs can never be overthrown by subtle arguments [Euripides]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]