20 ideas
| 17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
| 14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
| 3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
| 3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
| 14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
| 14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
| 14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
| 14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
| 14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
| 14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
| 14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
| 14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
| 3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
| 3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
| 3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
| 3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
| 3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
| 3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
| 3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
| 3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |