9 ideas
| 17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
| 19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |