17 ideas
17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |