Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'Why there isn't a ready-made world' and 'The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
22285 Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
22301 The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17962 The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
22324 It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
22279 Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
22291 Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
22295 Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
22310 The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
22298 Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
22287 If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
17644 Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
17648 It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
22284 'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17643 Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
22281 A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
17642 The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
22327 Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
22273 Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
22290 The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
22283 Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter]
22282 'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter]
22296 Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
17645 An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]