14 ideas
| 17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
| 13010 | In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine] |
| 9002 | Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine] |
| 13681 | Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider] |
| 13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
| 9003 | Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine] |
| 9004 | If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine] |
| 9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
| 9006 | Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine] |
| 9001 | Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine] |
| 9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
| 9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
| 9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
| 9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |