20 ideas
17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
12296 | 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K] |
18882 | You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons] |
12297 | Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K] |
4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |
8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |