15 ideas
| 9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
| 17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
| 9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
| 9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
| 9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
| 9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
| 9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
| 9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
| 9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
| 9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
| 9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
| 16659 | Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world [Olivi] |
| 9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
| 16673 | Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts [Olivi] |
| 16663 | Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being [Olivi] |