7 ideas
17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
8447 | In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege] |
8448 | Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege] |
22419 | 'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn] |
8446 | We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege] |
8449 | Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege] |
6318 | The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine] |