Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' and 'The Limits of Contingency'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M]
Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M]
Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]