Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'Reference and Essence (1st edn)' and 'Psychosemantics'

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34 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
18889 Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17962 The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14627 S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
3005 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
7014 A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
18888 Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
3008 Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor]
3009 Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor]
2990 Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
2994 In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
7326 Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor]
15494 We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
3001 Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
2993 Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
3011 Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
5498 Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
2995 Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
2991 Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
3002 If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
2992 We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
2988 Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
3010 Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
2999 Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3012 Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
2998 Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
3006 Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
3007 Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
3004 The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
3000 Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
3003 Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
2996 Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
18886 Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
18887 The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
18891 Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N]