15 ideas
| 13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
| 10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
| 10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
| 9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
| 10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
| 7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
| 10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
| 10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
| 10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |