Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'Nature Without Essence'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
17867 If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
17877 The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17872 Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog]
17871 Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog]
17866 Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog]
17868 Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17870 Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
17869 Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
17876 Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
7322 Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7325 Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
17873 Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7323 If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7328 The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
7329 Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
22489 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
17864 Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
17863 Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]