Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'The Analysis of Mind' and 'Rationality'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling]
Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]