27 ideas
17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |
17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |